We have assessed the determinants of the choice of integration, relational contracting (keiretsu sourcing) and market sourcing by seven Japanese automobile manufacturers (OEMs) with respect to 54 components in light of contract economics. Our major findings are the following. First, the specificity and interdependency of a component significantly promotes vertical integration over keiretsu and keiretsu over market, consistent with transaction cost economics. Second, interdependency is a more important consideration for the former choice than for the latter choice, and the reverse is the case for specificity. This suggests that the hold-up risk due to specific investment can be often effectively controlled by a relational contracting based on keiretsu sourcing, while accommodating non-contractible design changes may often require vertical integration. Third, while higher testability of a component makes the effects of specificity significantly smaller, it also promotes the choice of keiretsu sourcing over market sourcing. One interpretation of this last result is that while higher testability improves the contractibility of the component with high specificity, it simultaneously enhances the advantage of keiretsu sourcing since it provides more opportunities for the supplier to explore new information for a collaborative exploitation with an OEM. 
Introduction
This paper empirically examines the determinants of the boundaries of the firm, focusing on the Japanese auto industry. Since Coase's (1937) seminal work, the boundaries of the firm have long been one of most challenging issues for researchers, and the auto industry has been one of the most investigated industries.
1 A seminal paper based on a transaction cost view of the firm boundary is Monteverde and Teece (1982) , which demonstrated transaction cost, which was measured by engineering efforts and firm-specificity to design components, mattered for the vertical integration decision by OEMs (GM and Ford) 2 . This paper extends their analysis in three directions. First, for the dependent variable, in addition to the two choices (make internally or buy from the market), we introduce the third choice, "buy from affiliated ("keiretsu") suppliers." This sourcing from keiretsu seems to be a good example of relational contracting, which earlier literature on transaction cost economics does not pay much attention (see Williamson (1975) ), but the importance of which is now well recognized (see Williamson (1985) and Baker, Gibbons and Murphy (2002) ). Since keiretsu sourcing accounts for a major part of the component procurements by Japanese auto industry (more than 50% of the procurements of the components under this study for Toyota, Nissan and Honda), the dataset of the Japanese auto industry provide unique opportunities for us to examine the choice of integration and relational contracting simultaneously.
Second, for independent variables, we introduce a set of new variables on component characteristics based on their detailed survey 3 , to measure multiple dimensions of contracting environment (the specificity, interdependency and testability of a component) and to strengthen controls on missing variables (the complexity, safety, customer-value, and firm-standard of a component). The availability of these new variables allows us to inquire new questions, for an example, as to whether higher testability of a component enables more contracting choice for supplying a component with high specificity. Third, we use a set of time series data of the Japanese auto industry, which we have built up to cover the make-or-buy decisions of 7 OEMs on 54 types of components for almost two decades from 1984 to 2002.
The organization of this paper is the following. Section 2 provides theoretical framework for the organizational and contract choice for the efficient supply of a component in the automobile industry. Section 3 describes econometric model and data, and section 4 presents estimation results. Section 5 concludes.
Theoretical Framework
In this section we present a (reduced form) theoretical framework for the organizational and contract choice for efficient supply of a component in the automobile industry, drawing on the insights from the transaction cost economics (see Williamson (1975 Williamson ( , 1985 ) and the property rights theory(see Grossman and Hart (1986) ), so as to derive testable propositions. Efficient coordination of design activities between an OEM and a component supplier, the quality assurance of the components manufactured, and their low cost are the important determinants for the efficiency of component supply. In the case of automobile industry, efficient coordination with an OEM in design is a particularly important factor, since an automobile is a system product, the performance of which depends critically on how much each key component is designed in an integrative manner for a particular vehicle model. On the same ground, the quality assurance in manufacturing is critical, since a failure of one key component can make the entire automobile non-functional. To achieve efficiency in these terms, an OEM has the organizational choice between integration and non-integration as well as the contract choice between non-keiretsu (short-term 4 ) contracting and keiretsu (relational or long-term) contracting (see Figure 1 , which is based on Baker, Gibbons and Murphy (2002)) 5 .
( Figure 1) Formally, let us denote integration or make choice by the combination of y=1 and z=0, keiretsu or relational contracting choice by y=0 and z=1, and the market (or non-keiretsu) contracting choice by y=0 and z=0. We hypothesize that higher design specificity (s) of a component as well as higher interdependency (θ ) between the component and the other components in design would increase the value of vertical integration of that component production. High design specificity would involve the tangible or intangible investment specific to the OEM by the supplier, which is subject to hold-up risk. High interdependency in design would require frequent and extensive negotiations with a supplier when an OEM wishes to change the design of its components, which would not be contractible ex-ante. Vertical integration has advantages in promoting relation-specific investment and for accommodating non-contractible design changes (see Bajari and Tadelis (2001) and Tadelis (2002) ). Sourcing from keiretsu would have a similar but attenuated effect on the value of the component, since design change, for an example, will still involve negotiations between two firms. Thus, we hypothesize that the value of a component net of design cost is enhanced by vertical integration or keiretsu sourcing, the degree of which increases with the specificity and interdependency of the component: , which is the highest when integration is chosen ( 1 0 c c + ), reflecting the effect of the loss of ownership interest in cost reduction (internal procurement is cost-based). Sourcing from a keiretsu supplier would also provide smaller incentive for cost-reduction, compared to sourcing from the market, due to limited competition (
The cost of quality assurance would matter especially when the testability of the component is low and the component is specific to the OEM. We assume that as testability improves (the cost of testing becomes lower), the cost of quality assurance declines to zero. For a given level of testability, the cost of quality assurance would be higher for a spot supplier which would have the motivation to reduce the quality of the component to be supplied when it is effective for saving cost. A relational contracting could constrain the incentive for such quality-degradation, since once such conduct would be uncovered, the rent from long-term relationship would be lost (Shapiro (1983) ). In vertical integration, the provision of a strong incentive to an employee for cost-reduction would not be used, so as to avoid creating an incentive for compromising quality due to multitasking (Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) for a theory and Slade (1996) for an empirical analysis). Given these considerations, we can hypothesize that the cost of quality assurance increases with specificity, declines with testability and is reduced by vertical integration or relational contracting:
, with ρ indicating the efficiency of keiretsu relative to vertical integration for quality assurance.
Finally, we take into account the quality improvement based on the collaboration between a supplier (gathering information useful for quality improvement) and an OEM (its implementation) 6 . We assume that a vertically integrated supplier does not engage in voluntary efforts for gathering information for quality improvement, due to its weak incentive for such information exploration (the assignment of the patent right of an employee inventor to a firm in Agion and Tirole (1994) and the absence of recourse when the upstream party reneges in Baker, Gibbons and Murphy (2002) ). A supplier external to the OEM would have an incentive to do such information exploration. In addition, such information can be more easily shared with the OEM when it is a keiretsu supplier than when it is an independent supplier, since relational contracting enables non-contractible efforts being rewarded ex-post. In addition, we assume that high testability of the component would create more opportunities for a supplier to discover information useful for improving the quality of the component. Given these considerations, the value of quality improvement enabled by the information discovered by a supplier is given by The efficient organizational and contractual choice is given by
, where η is a random variable. The choices are over vertical integration, keiretsu and market:
(y,z)={(1,0),(0,1), (0,0)}. Given the above analytical framework, we can derive the following three propositions on the effects of component characteristics on organizational and contractual choice, using sourcing from keiretsu as the base.
Proposition 1 (Effect of Specificity)
We would observe more vertical integration relative to keiretsu sourcing and more keiretsu sourcing relative to market sourcing for a component with higher specificity (s) . These effects decline with testability. 
We can depict the choice for each combination of the component characteristics in the parameter space. The dividing lines for choices are characterized in the following manner, assuming their existence.
The dividing line between vertical integration and keiretsu (V-K line):
The dividing line between keiretsu and market (K-M line):
The dividing line between market and vertical integration (M-V line): Figure 3 . As a result, the choice can make a "jump" from market sourcing to vertical integration in the region where specificity is low and interdependency is high as either variable has a higher value. As testability increases, the keiretsu region may expand in both upward and downward directions, due to increasing contractibility and increasing value of information sharing (see (8.3) and (8.2)).
(Figure 3)

Econometric Model and Data
In light of the above three propositions, we evaluate the choice of the three modes of component transactions between 7 Japanese OEMs and their suppliers (including in-house divisions) with respect to 54 major components (see Table A2 in the Appendix) for 7 every-three years from 1984 to 2002. The independent variables on the engineering characteristics of the components are constructed from a questionnaire survey of the automobile engineers at four Japanese OEMs on the detailed characteristics of the components (see Table A3 in the Appendix).A detailed description and the sources of the data are provided in Appendix 1, including how these variables were measured.
The basic econometric model we employ is the multinomial logistic model with the dominant choice of each OEM firm i in procuring a component j in time t among the three alternative transaction modes (vertical integration, keiretsu sourcing, market sourcing 7 ) as the dependent variable. We also report the results based on the ordinary least squares focusing on the choice of two alternatives in terms of the difference of procurement shares (vertical integration vs. keiretsu sourcing, and keiretsu sourcing vs. market sourcing) in Appendix 2. As shown in Figure 4 , a firm often combines two or even three modes in procuring a component.
For an example, 22% of the procurements involve both keiretsu sourcing and market sourcing, and 3% of the contracts involve all three modes. However, we have specified only one of them as the primary choice which is the transaction mode that supplies most, following Monteverde and Teece (1982) . We use the choice of keiretsu sourcing as the base and evaluate the determinants of the choices of market sourcing and vertical integration relative to keiretsu sourcing in our multinomial estimation, to be consistent with the above propositions.
(Figure 4)
Firm i chooses one of the three organizational or contract choices for each component j for year t, according to the following probability function: Our primary explanatory variables are specificity, interdependency, and testability.
The variable specificity constructed from the questionnaire survey indicates how the design criteria and the interfaces of the component is specific to the firm 8 . The variable interdependency indicates the degree of relatedness with the other components in terms of design, structure, function, and manufacturing. The variable testability represents how easily the component can be tested as a stand-alone object, and whether it can be developed and experimented on the stand-alone basis.
Let us move on to control variables, which may affect the contractual or organizational choice and have correlation with the above independent variables. We introduce four variables indicating the characteristics of components as well as two variables indicating the scale and stability of OEMs' production, in addition to firm and year fixed effects (dummies In addition, we use the level as well as the change of the total volume of vehicle production of the OEM. The former is included to examine how the degree of scale economy of an OEM might affect the choice. The latter (annual change (%) in production volume on the average over the previous three years) is included to examine how the OEM may use the choice to adjust for the change of production volume. Finally, we use 6 firm dummies and 6 year dummies to control firm level and year level fixed effects. We also introduce firm by year dummies for robustness check. Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for these variables. 35% in 1984 and 36% in 2002) , and market sourcing accounted for 55 % to 61%. Figure 6 shows the relations between the choice and the three primary independent variables. It shows that the share of both vertical integration and keiretsu sourcing increases with specificity and interdependency. The share of market sourcing increases with testability, although this variable have significant negative correlations with specificity and interdependency (see Table A4 ) 9 . Figure 7 shows the variation of these choices among 7 sample OEM firms with the size of their production volumes. It is clear that the share of keiretsu sourcing increases with the production volume, while such relationship is not observed for the share of vertical integration.
(Table 1, Figure 5 , Figure 6 and Figure 7) Table 2 presents two basic estimations, with or without the interaction terms between specificity and testability and between specificity and interdependency. We use robust standard errors, to address potential heteroskedasticity. As shown in Model 1, the coefficients of both specificity and interdependency have expected signs and significant coefficients, consistent with Proposition 1 and 2. Market sourcing is significantly less preferred to keiretsu sourcing for a component with high specificity (s) or high interdependency (θ ). Simultaneously, vertical integration is preferred to keiretsu sourcing when interdependency or specificity is important (although the latter effect is significant only at 10% level). In addition, the coefficient of interdependency is more than five times larger for the choice between vertical integration and keiretsu sourcing than the choice between market and keiretsu sourcing, while the coefficient of specificity is more than two times larger for the choice between vertical integration and keiretsu sourcing than the choice between market and keiretsu sourcing. Thus, specificity is a more important consideration for the choice between market and keiretsu sourcing, while interdependency is more an important consideration for the choice between vertical integration and keiretsu sourcing. This suggests that the hold-up risk due to specific investment can be often effectively controlled by a relational contracting based on keiretsu sourcing, while accommodating non-contractible design changes may often require vertical integration.
Estimation Results
As for the variable testability, it does not have a significant coefficient for the choice between vertical integration and keiretsu choice as implied by Proposition 3, but it has a significantly negative coefficient for the choice between market sourcing and keiretsu sourcing, implying that a firm prefers keiretsu sourcing to market sourcing significantly more, the higher the testability of the component. One interpretation for this result is that an OEM firm may prefer using keiretsu sourcing when the testability of the component is high, since the procurement of such component can provide large opportunities for a supplier to obtain useful information for promoting quality improvement and such information can be more easily shared with a keiretsu supplier than with a non-affiliated supplier. A keiretsu supplier may have both the incentive to gather information for quality improvement enabled by the high testability of the component and to share the information with the OEM for its implementation.
Let us turn to the coefficients of control variables. Complexity and safety promote the choice of keiretsu sourcing over both integration and market sourcing, although the effect of complexity on the choice between market and keiretsu is not significant. The quality of a component important for safety can generate significant externality for the other components, providing a reason for vertical integration. However, placing the supplier of such component within an OEM may dilute an incentive for safety due to multi-tasking. In this regard, the keiretsu supplier may have an advantage. On the other hand, customer-value promotes integration over keiretsu sourcing, and market sourcing over keiretsu. Firm-standard promote keiretsu sourcing over integration and over market sourcing, although the latter effect is not significant. Since standardization within a firm would facilitate the development of the documentations for specifications, it would enhance the contracting-out. Finally, the production volume favors keiretsu sourcing over market sourcing, which indicates the importance of the economy of scale for keiretsu production.
As for firm dummies, a larger automobile manufacturer (Toyota, Nissan and Honda) prefers keiretsu sourcing over market sourcing, even though the production volume is controlled.
This may indicate a non-linearity of the effects of the production volume or other firm-specific effects. As for the choice between vertical integration and keiretsu sourcing, Honda exceptionally disfavors integration. As for time dummies, we observe tendency toward keiretsu sourcing: increasing choice of keiretsu sourcing over both vertical integration and market sourcing (except for the choice between market sourcing over keiretsu in year 2002 10 ).
Let us turn to Model 2 with the interaction terms. Let us start with the interaction between specificity and testability. What the coefficient of the interaction term suggests is that while the specificity of a component favors vertical integration over keiretsu sourcing and keiretsu sourcing over market sourcing when testability is low, such preference declines as the testability of a component increases even though the relationship is not reversed. These results are consistent with the view that higher testability enables outsourcing even if the component is specific (see Proposition 1). As for the interaction between interdependency and specificity, it is not significant for either choice. The signs of the coefficients suggest that the interaction term tends to weaken the individual effects of specificity and interdependency, which is not consistent with their complementary effects. These results may reflect non-linearity (decreasing returns) of these individual effects. As for the control variables and the other variables, the estimation results are very similar to those for Model 1. Table 3 inquire the robustness of the basic findings of Table 2 .
Models3 to Model 5 of
Model 3 uses only the cross section data of year 2002. Since our data on the engineering characteristics of the components are available only for recent years, using these data for much earlier years may cause biased estimates. The estimation results of Model 3, however, are highly consistent with those of Model 1. Specificity and interdependency promotes vertical integration over keiretsu sourcing, and specificity and testability promotes keiretsu sourcing over market sourcing. Model 4 introduces the firm by year dummies, so as to control time variant missing variables at firm levels better, such as the potential changes of the engineering capability of an OEM firm over time. The estimation results, including the sizes of the estimated coefficients, are very similar to those of Model 1, suggesting that the combination of firm fixed effects, the time dummies and the level as well as the change of the production volumes of the OEMs effectively control the time variant missing variables at firm levels.
Finally, Model 5 uses the sample of only three biggest OEMs of Japan: Toyota, Nissan and Honda. These firms are different from the other smaller OEMs in the sense that they have well developed keiretsu-supplier network (see Figure 7 ), so that they have more freedom and flexibility to choose the best organizational and contractual mode of component procurements.
On the other hand, the other firms may have no choice but to use the keiretsu firms of three biggest OEMs (market sourcing by these other firms) , since their supplier networks are limited.
The estimation results of Model 5 are, however highly consistent with those of Model 1, with respect to the effects of specificity, interdependency and testability. Specificity has become insignificant for the choice between vertical integration and keiretsu sourcing, suggesting that specificity does not matter for that choice by a firm with a well developed keiretsu network. The variable interdependency remains highly significant and has larger coefficients. Appendix 2 shows the estimation results which focus on the choices in term of two alternatives and on the difference of their procurement shares. That is, we use the difference of the share of vertical integration and that of keiretsu sourcing as a dependent variable, focusing on the sample of the procurements involving no market sourcing, and the difference of the share of keiretsu sourcing and that of market sourcing as another dependent variable, focusing on the sample of the procurements using no vertical integration. The results for three key variables are very similar (See Table A5 ).
Conclusions and Discussions
We have assessed the determinants of the choice among vertical integration, sourcing from keiretsu and sourcing from the market of 54 components by seven Japanese automobile manufacturers (OEMs) in light of contract economics for 7 every-three years from 1984 to 2002.Our major findings are the following. First, consistent with transaction cost economics, the interdependency and (much lesser degree) specificity of a component make vertical integration preferred to keiretsu sourcing. Both of them also make the sourcing from keiretsu preferred to market sourcing. Second, interdependency is a significantly more important consideration for the choice between vertical integration and keiretsu sourcing than the choice between market and keiretsu sourcing, while the reverse is the case for specificity. This suggests that the hold-up risk due to specific investment can be often effectively controlled by a relational contracting based on keiretsu sourcing, while accommodating non-contractible design changes may often require vertical integration.
Third, we have found that higher testability of a component significantly makes the effects of specificity smaller, consistent with the view that high testability of an output enables contracting of a component even with high design specificity. Separate from this effect, higher testability of a component also makes a firm prefer keiretsu sourcing over market sourcing. One interpretation of this result is that an OEM firm may prefer using keiretsu sourcing when the testability of the component is high, since the procurement of such component can provide large opportunities for a supplier to obtain useful information for promoting quality improvement and such information can be more easily shared with a keiretsu supplier than with a non-affiliated supplier. A keiretsu supplier may have both the incentive to gather information for quality improvement in the environment of high testability of the component and to share the information with the OEM for its implementation.
Our empirical analysis also indicates several other interesting observations on the structure of supplier system. Larger volume production by an OEM and more standardization within the firm promote keiretsu sourcing both over market sourcing and over vertical integration, which may indicate the importance of the economy of scale and scope base for the development of keiretsu network. In addition, the scale of an OEM does not affect the share of the components supplied by in-house suppliers. Furthermore, safety concern promotes the choice of keiretsu sourcing over both market sourcing and vertical integration.
There are, however, several remaining issues. First, we do not consider the value of multiple mode procurement policy. We have simply assumed that there is a single best mode of procurement for each component, even though multiple mode procurement policy may be the optimal policy. An OEM takes into account the importance of preserving procurement competition in selecting suppliers. Second, we have assumed the exogeneity of the engineering characteristics of the components, which are constructed from the surveys on the engineers of four OEMs. However, we may expect that these characteristics are affected by the organizational or contract characteristics, e.g. whether a supplier is vertically integrated or not.
Third, further analysis would be needed to search for the optimal boundary of firms, with respect to creation of new information and innovation. Our analysis suggests a view that a keiretsu system may have a certain advantage in generating the incentives for both autonomous innovation and collaboration with an OEM. An interesting question would be how the keiretsu system would survive in the environment of "open" innovation. Table A1 Among about 200 components, we picked up 54 components that were covered by the report throughout the period we analyzed (from 1984 to 200). Table A2 lists the components included in the dataset.
To measure the characteristics of these components, a questionnaire survey was carried out with four Japanese OEMs (anonymous due to our confidential agreement). The Table A3 for the questions to measure each variable of component characteristics).
Definition of Keiretsu Suppliers
As for the definition of keiretsu suppliers, we use the definition by IRC, whose report shows if a particular supplier is a keiretsu supplier of a particular OEM. According to IRC, while the financial tie (stock ownership) is the most important factor to define keiretsu relationships, other factors such as sales dependency, director dispatch, and historical relationships, are also taken into consideration. For example, even without financial tie, a supplier is heavily dependent in sales for a long period upon a particular OEM and the industry generally sees the supplier as a keiretsu supplier of the OEM, it is a keiretsu supplier of the OEM in IRC's definition. Although IRC does not have an objective, well-defined definition of keiretsu suppliers, we think their definition captures well the actual perceptions shared by practitioners in the industry, which should be relevant in the make-or-buy decisions by OEMs.
To define and use alternative, more objective definition is one of the next steps we would like to take in the future (see, for example, Lincoln, Gerlach, and Takahashi 1992 for discussion of Japanese keiretsu networks). The connections between this component and other components (the interfaces with other components) have been clearly standardized as a set of rules within your company.
II-2
The connections between this component and other components (the interfaces with other components) have been standardized and shared across your company.
II-3
The connections between this component and other components (the interfaces with other components) have been clearly standardized as a set of rules within the industry. (*reversed
II-4
Techniques and methods for manufacturing the main part of this component have been standardized within your company.
II-5
Criteria for designing the main part of this component (such as its dimension, strength and the materials to be used) have been standardized within your company.
II-6
The main part of this component has been standardized and shared across your company.
II-7
Criteria for designing the main part of this component have been standardized within the industry. (*reversed scale)
III-1
This component is designed to perform a particular function only when combined with other components.
III-2
When designing this component, its connections with other components have to be considered and adjusted carefully.
III-3
The function of this component is self-contained. (It has little interdependency with other components). (*reversed scale)
III-4
This component is structurally connected and interdependent with other components.
III-5
A high degree of accuracy and precision is needed for this component when combined with other components (at the design and manufacturing levels) in order to ensure best performance
III-6
A high degree of accuracy and precision is needed for this component when combined with other components (at the design and manufacturing levels) in order to achieve a better layout.
III-7
When mounting this component or combining it with other components, coordination with the body and other components is required.
IV-1
Advanced technology is used in this component.
IV-2
The technology used in this component is fast-changing.
IV-3
Highly sophisticated expertise is needed for designing this component.
IV-4
This is an important safety component which greatly affects the safety of the vehicle.
IV-5
The quality of this component can be assured independently of other components.
IV-6
Prototype testing can be conducted independently of other components.
IV-7
It is not easy to achieve the function and performance required for this component.
IV-8
This component is comprised of many subcomponents.
IV-9
This component is structurally complex.
IV-10
The function and performance required for this component are complex (multidimensional).
IV-11
The function and performance required for this component are vague in nature and difficult to measure in numeric terms. (*reversed scale)
IV-12
It is difficult to manufacture this component in terms of quality and yield. (*reversed scale)
IV-13
When designing this component, manufacturing requirements have to be carefully taken into consideration.
IV-14
This component offers relatively high value (selling price/manufacturing cost) compared to other auto components.
IV-15
The quality of this component greatly affects the marketability of the end product (vehicle). Note. We do not report the correlations among dummy variables. 
